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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIIINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE.
PRoFESsoRs CHESTER G. VERNIER AND ELMER A. WILCOX.
APPEAL AND ERROR.
Commonwealth v. Comporto, Pa., 8I Atl. 9o6. Invited Error. Where, at
the request of defendant, the court strikes out a portion of his confession re-
lating' to his criminal record, he cannot afterwards denand that the entire
confession be stricken out on the ground that it must go in as a whole, since
he cannot complain on appeal of the action of the court at his own request
in excluding a portion of the confession.
BIGAMY.
Bennett v. State, Miss., 56 So. 777. Proof of Divorce. In a prosecution
for bigamy, the trial court charged that the state had made out a prima facie
case by proof of a legal marriage, a subsequent marriage to another woman,
and that the first wife was not dead, and that the burden was upon the
defendant to prove, if he could, that the first marriage had been dissolved
by divorce. Held, that the presumption which exists in civil cases, that the
first marriage had been dissolved by divorce before the second was contracted,
does not apply in a criminal prosecution for bigamy. The charge of the court
was therefore correct. The conviction was affirmed.
BURGLARY.
Alinis v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 140 S. W. 227. Private Residence. De-
fendant was convicted of burglary under a statute which applied to breaking
and 'entering a "house." He contends that the evidence showed a violation
of a different statute, relating to "private residences.' He broke into the
middle room of a store-house which was divided into three rooms. A restaurant
was carried on in the front room, the cooking was done in the middle room,
the prosecutor and his wife' sleDt in the rear room. Held, that the cook room
was not part of a private residence. The' conviction was affirmed.
CHANGE OF VENUE.
State v. Cliffbrd Wash., 1i8 Pac. 40. Construction of Statute. A statute
provided for a change-' of venue for prejudice of the judge, on motion sup-
ported by the affidavit of the party or of his attorney; The statute did not
state when the application should be made. A defendant, judging from the-
rulings made on certain preliminary matters that the judge was prejudiced
against him, filed a motion and affidavit for a change of venue, which was
denied. He then, sought to, enforce a change, by mandamus. The court said
that under the statute the, right to a -change of venue was absolute if, the, con-
ditions imposed were complied, with. But if the statute were applied literally
the -application for a change might be made at any time before the entry of'
judgment. The legislature could not have intended to so handicap the courts
in the enforcement of the-law; hence there was need of construction. It could
not have been intended that a party could submit to the jurisdiction of the
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court until from some ruling he became fearful that the judge was not favorable
to his view of the case, and then ask for the change. Hence it was held that
the application was properly denied, as it was not made until orders had been
made in the case, though those orders were not on the merits.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Ex Parte Hages, Okla. Cr. App., II8 Pad. 6o9. Cable Theory. The peti-
tioners were in custody awaiting trial, and applied for a writ of habeas corpus,
on the ground that there was -no evidence which showed that they were guilty
of the charge upon which they were held. The evidence against them was
wholly circumstantial.- No one circumstance testified to was sufficient to prove
their guilt, but each of them, standing alone, might be entirely consistent with
innocence, yet when all were taken and combined together, they produced an
irresistible conclusion that the defendants were guilty. Held, that circum-
stantial evidence is not like a chain, but like a cable. "No chain is stronger
than its weakest link, and will never pull or bind more than its weakest link
will stand. With its link broken, the power of the chain is gone; but it is
altogether different with a cable. Its strength does not depend upon one strand,
but is made up of a union and combination of the strength of all its strands."
The petitioners were remanded into custody.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
PeoPle v. Robinson, 132 N. Y. Supp. 674. Equal Protection of Laws. Dis-
crimination between races.
In proceedings before a magistrate for disorderly conduct, consisting in
sending to a woman letters declaring love and proposing and insisting upon
marriage, the reception over defendant's objection of evidence that he is of
the negro race, and the taking of that fact into consideration by the magistrate,
do not violate any constitutional right of the defendant, and do not deprive him
of the equal protection of the laws, nor descriminate against him on account
of race or color.
DIsoRnERLY CONDUCT.
People v. Robinson, 132 N. Y. Supp. 674. Elements of the Offense. Where
a man, upon slight acquaintance, sends to a woman letters declaring love and
proposing and insisting upon marriage, notwithstanding requests through a
third person to desist, and his failure to receive any replies, he may be found
guilty of a violation of Consolidation Act, Sec. 1459, authorizing any police
justice to have brought before him to answer the charge of disorderly conduct
any person guilty of such disorderly conduct as in the opinion of the magistrate
tends to a breach of the peace.
EMBEZZLEMENT.
State v. Ensley, Ind., 97 N. E. 113. Necessity of a Demand Under Statute
Relating to Public Officers. Burns' Ann. Stat. 19o8, Sec. 2284, requiring every
county officer receiving money in his official capacity to pay over, at the end of his
term, to his successor, all moneys in his hands, and declaring that any county
officer failing to so pay over such moneys when called on to, do so shall be
guilty of embezzlement, when construed in the light of the history of the legis-
lation. on the subject as originally enacted in 1883, and the judicial construc-
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tions placed on the original act, does not require a demand by the successor
to make the predecessor guilty of embezzlement for failure to pay over money
in his hands, so that an indictment charging a county treasurer with embezzle-
ment need not allege that a demand for the delivery of the money by the
accused to the successor in office was made.
Enon.
Coates v. State, Ala. App., 56 So. 6. Wrong Jury List. The court ordered
the sheriff to summon the jurors specially drawn and to serve upon the de-
fendant a list of all the jurors summoned for the week in which the trial
was set. By a mistake, the sheriff served on the defendant the list of jurors
for the week after the trial. On discovering the mistake, he then served
the proper list. The first list showed upon its face that it was not the list from
which the jurors to try the defendant would be selected. Held, the service
of the wrong list was no ground for quashing the venire subsequently served
on the defendant.
Dauson v. State, Fla., 56 So. 677. Proof of Prejudice. The trial judge
had given an instruction upon the right of police offiMcers to make arrests with-
out warrant, although there was no evidence that an arrest had been made.
The Appellate Court was satisfied, from the entire record, that the defendant
was not and could not have been injured by this charge. Held, that upon a
writ of error, the points at issue are presumed to have been fairly and im-
partially tried and determined in accordance with the law, and the final judg-
ment is presumed to be correct., This presumption must be met in the Ap-
pellate Court and overcome by the plaintiff in error. "It is incumbent upon
him to show that the different rulings of the trial court of which he complains,
or some of them, are so infected with errors as to call for a complete re-
versal of the judgment. The mere fact that a technical error was committed
in the trial court in some of its rulings, may not be sufficient. The errors must
have been harmful and prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff in error." As
no reversable error was shown, the judgment was affirmed.
Coleman v. State, Okla. Cr. App., 118 Pac. 594. Proof of Prejudice. On
a trial for perjury, the court submitted the materiality of the false testimony
to the jury. The Appellatq Court held that the testimony so submitted, was
material, but said that if it was error to leave it to the jury, the defendant could
not have been harmed thereby, as it gave him an additional opportunity of
escaping punishment, if the jury had erroneously decided that the evidence was
not material. "The doctrine of this court is that no man can be heard to
complain of the commission of an error upon his trial, unless he can reasonably
show by the record that he suffered injury on account of such error. To
secure the reversal of a conviction in this court, the burden is upon the ap-
pellant to show both error and injury therefrom. In other words, before
error committed on trial, will be ground for reversal, it must reasonably ap-
pear from the inspection of the entire record that such error deprived the
appellant of some substantial right and thereby worked to his injury." The
conviction was affirmed.
Still v,. State, Tenn., 140 S. W., 298. Admission of Incompetent Evidence
Is Prejudicial. On a trial for murder, a dying declaration was received. It
accused defendant of the crime, stated the circumstances, and disclosed jealousy
as a motive. Held, that while the statements identifying the perpetrator and
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narrating the circumstances of the crime were properly received, the statement
showing, jealousy was" improperly received as i4 related to a past transaction,
not part, of the res' gestae, and involved a threat, made by defendant. As there
was no other. evidence of 'motive or of threats, this evidence was, prejudicial.
The court cannot inquire whether if- this statement be disregarded the lawful
evidence sustains the verdict, that is for the jury. The constitution guarantees
a trial by jury. This means a trial upon competent legal testimony. "It is
only where the- court can see- that the incompetent evidence admitted did not
prejudice th-e defendant in the trial' court that this court will consider and
determine the case upon the facts." The conviction was reversed.
ERROR AFTER VERDICT.
People, v. Scheuren, 132 N. Y. Supp. io25. Cure by Re-sentence. Defendant
was indicted for "feloniously and extorsively" attempting "feloniously and ex-
torsively to obtain" money, and was convicted, and sentenced to state's prison for
not less than three years nor more than five years and six months. The threat
was verbal; and defendant was guilty of a misdemeanor only. Held, that, as
the error in sentencing defendant occurred after the verdict, it does not affect
the conviction and the proper procedure is to re-sentence the defendant.
EVIDENCE.
State v. Stapp, Wash., II8 Pa'c. 337. Testimony of Accomplices. A con-
viction may be sustained although the defendant's connection with the crime
is shown only by the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices, and though
there are some -inconsistent statements in their testimony.
Martin ' .State, Ala. App., 56 So. 3. Illegal Search. The defendant was
sitting on a porch of-,a house owned by a mining company. The manager of
the mines and a deputy sheriff came up. The manager drew a pistol and
ordered the defendant to throw up his hands and when his hands went up,
the manager ordered the officer to search the defendant's person and valise.
They found twenty-eight half pints of whisky in his suit case. On trial for
violation of the prohibition law, the manager and deputy sheriff were per-
mitted to testif ' as to finding the whisky in the suit case. Held, the evidence
was adiissible, even though 'the search by the parties arresting him may have'
been illegal.
People v. Jennings, 96 N. E. 1077. Evidence of tFinger Marks-Adlnissi-
bility. Where, on the issue of identity of accused as the person committing
a crime, there was evidence of the imprint of finger marks on the fresh paint
on a railing of the house in which the offense charged was committed, photo-
graphs of the imprint and of finger prints of accused were admissible in evi-
dence for comparison, together with the testimony of expprts that the two
sets of prints were made by the fingers of the same person, the, accuracy of
the photograph not being questioned.'
The classification of fiiger-print impressions, and their method of identifica-
tion, is a subject requiring special study, and persons who have made a special
study of the subject are competent to testify as experts and to give their
opinion that two sets of finger prints were made by the same person.
EXPERT WITNESS.
Odon' v. State, Ala., 56 So. 913. Non-Medical Witness. A person who
has handled, a great many insane persons and has' observed and studied, them
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while they were in his charge, being transferred from one place to another,
and has "lately read medical works on the subject and studied in that way,"
is not qualified to testify as an expert on insanity. "As a general rule, only
medical- men, that is, persons licensed by law to practice the profession of
medicine, can- testify as experts on the question of insanity. . . . An ex-
ception may perhaps be recognized where the witness has made a protracted
and systematic- study of mental science and disease under approved conditions."
EXTORTION.
it Re Shepard, Cal., ii8 Pac. 513. By Securing Loans. Defendant was a
member of a city council. He solicited loans from parties having petitions
for the granting of franchises or , privileges by the- council, or having large
claims against the city, while their petitions or claims were pending or accruing,
and moneys were advanced to him on his unsecured notes unwillingly by these
parties to prevent unfavorable official action by him. It was not charged that
the defendant voted in favor of any of these claims or petitions, when, to
protect the rights and interestA of the public, he should- have opposed them.
Held, that it is extortion for a public official to demand money as a con-
dition of doing his duty, and more especially if, it is demanded as a condition
to allowing a just claim against a public corporation.
EXTRADITION.
Ex Parte Wilson, Tex. Cr. App., 14o S. W. 98. Kidnaping. The relator
was unlawfully seized in Mexico and forcibly brought across the international
bridge at El Paso. On the American end of the bridge he was arrested by
El Paso officers, who were guarding the bridge during the Mexican revolu-
tion, as a fugitive from justice from Nevada. The governor of Nevada issued
requisition papers and the governor of Texas issued a warrant directing that
the relator be delivered to the agent of Nevada. Relator then brought habeas
corpus. Held, that as the El' Paso officers were not shown to have had any-
thing to do with the case tillafter relator had been brought across the boundary,
the arrest by them and subsequent detention were lawful. Qtiery whether the
result would have been the same had the officers partitipated in the illegal
seizure in Mexico. The relator was remanded into custody.
FALSE PRETENSES.
Horton v. State, Ohio, 96 N. E. 797. Defenses. It is no defense to an
indictment for obtaining money by false pretenses that the transaction in which
the money was so obtained was unlawful.
FORGERY.
People v. Lewinger, Ill., 96 N. E. 837. Materiality of Alteration of a Chieck.
Under the Negotiable Instruments Act, Sec. 17, providing that where the
sum payable in a check, etc., is expressed both in words and figures, and
there is a discrepancy between the two, the sum expressed by the words is
that payable, if the words are unambiguous, where a check recited that the
sum payable was "$2,500" and the words in the body of the check were "twenty-
five hundred and no/Ioo dollars," the alteration of the figures so as to read




Davis v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 140 S. W. 349. Ownership. An information
for larceny alleged that the property of J. S. was stolen. The proof was that
it belonged to J. S. and E. S. as partners. A statute provided that when prop-
erty is owned in common or jointly by two or more persons, the ownership
may be alleged to be in all or either of them. Held, there was no variance.
Commonwealth v. Roberts, Ky. App., 14o S. W. 312. Immaterial Repugnancy.
One paragraph of an indictment -for bribery charged that the offense was com-
mitted on the "27th day of February, 1911," another paragraph alleged that it
was committed "at the November election, 191o." As .it was manifest from
the indictment that the offense intended to be charged was committed at the
November election, the insertion of the erroneous February date did not and
could not mislead the defendant. Hence the judgment overruling a demurrer
to the indictment was affirmed.
Chapman v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 14o S. W. 441. Sfilciency. A statute
made it criminal to "bet or wager any money, at any game of cards, except
in a private residence occupied by a family." Defendant was convicted on
an indictment charging that he did "unlawfully bet and wager money at a game
played with cards." Held, that the indictment was fatally defective because it did
not negative the exception. The conviction was reversed and the case dis-
missed.
State v." Carruth, Vt., 81 Atl. 922. Negativing Exceptions. The mere fact
that an exception is contained in a section of a criminal statute subsequent to
that defining the offense, or in a later statute, is not conclusive that it need not
be negatived in an indictment, the true test being whether the exception is so
incorporated with the enactment as to be a material part of the definition or
description of the offense.
INSANITY.
Adair v. State, Okla. App., 118 Pac. 416. Burden of Proof. The defendant
is presumed to be sane, and this presumption of law stands until it is over-
come by the evidence in the case. If any evidence is introduced, tending to
prove that the defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the
act. charged, then the burden of proving the sanity of the defendant devolves
upon the prosecution, and the state is bound to establish the sanity of the
defendant, like all other elements of the crime, beyond a reasonable doubt.
INSTRUCTIONS.
Irving v. State, Miss., 56 So. 377. Circumstantial Evidence. An instruc-
tion that circumstantial evidence "may arise so high in the scale of belief as
to generate full and complete conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and when
it does arise so high in the minds of the jury as to convince them of the de-
fendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty, then they
are authorized to act upon it and convict the defendant," is fatally defective,
because it omits the necessary qualification, that circumstantial evidence,
in order to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, must exclude every reason-
able hypothesis than that of guilt.
PAROLE.
Ex Parte McClure, Okla. Cr. App., 118 Pac. 591. Illegal Parole by Court.
The defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor, sentenced to the county jail
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for a period of six months and committed. After he had been imprisoned a
month, he was discharged by the court on giving an appeal bond, and the time
for perfecting his appeal was extended. It was agreed with the judge that
the appeal would not be perfected, but that the prisoner would be discharged
on probation during his good behavior. He was required to and did report
to the judge until notified that he need not report further. Later he was
rearrested and committed to the county jail to serve out the sentence. The
constitution vested the power to grant a parole in the governor. The court
did not have such power. Held, that as the judgment had not been stayed as
provided by law, and the defendant had not served his senteiice and was at
liberty, he might be arrested as an escape and ordered into custody upon the
unexecuted judgment.
PERJURY.
State; v. Parrish, La., 56 So. 503. Oath Not Required by Law. In an
affidavit made for the-purpose of obtaining a saloon license, the defendant falsely
swore that he had never been charged with violating any of the laws of the State
or municipality. The statute under which the license was granted did not re-
quire that the applicant should make oath that he had not violated any such law.
Held, that the oath must be administered in accordance with the law in order
to make one who has sworn falsely guilty of perjury, and that it must clearly ap-
pear that the matter sworn to was required by law. The ruling of lower court
quashing the indictment was affirmed.
RAPE.
People %,. Lewis, Ill., 96 X. 1_ ioo5. Harmless Error. In a prosecution
for rape, where the evidence tended to show that the act had been consum-
mated, and not that a mere assault had been made, the giving of an instruction
that an assault with an intent to commit any felony shall subject the offender
to imprisonment not less than one nor more than 14 years, while erroneous, was
not prejudicial to the accused.
RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.
State v. Lewis, Kan., 118 Pac. 59. Delay Caused by the Defendant. A
statute provided that a person accused of a criminal offense should be discharged
if he was not brought to trial before the end of the third term of the court after
the information was filed, unless the delay happened on his application or was
occasioned by want of time to try the case. The defendant was not tried at
the first term after the information was filed. At the second term the judge
was sick and a pro tempore judge was elected and qualified. The -defendant
objected to the jurisdiction of this judge and the case was continued. At the
third term, defendant objected to the jurisdiction of the pro tempore judge and
the case was again continued. At the fourth term, .the defendant moved for a
discharge. Held, that as the delay was due to the defendant's objection to the
pro tempore judge, "the delay happened on his application," within the mean-
ing of the statute, hence the defendant was not entitled to be discharged.
S=F-DEFENsFx
Lett v. State, Ala. App., 56 So. 5. Arming With a Deadly Weapon. Defend-
ant and -deceased were on unfriendly terms. The deceased, accompanied by two
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men,, and-armed- -with~ a Winchester rifle -and- a -pistol, 1went to the defendant's
gatd-andt calledt.him to-come out. saying he,,wanted, to -see 'him a minute. The
defendant'- k I d up- his-,gun, walked towards-the deceased, , and shot-him. It
was-disputed- whether, the-shooting-was in self-defense,- Held; ihat,if the- defend-
ant- armed' himself, not, for- the-.purpose --of, aggression, but ,forithe-purpose of
defense;. he did not thereby -lose the right- to invoke the. doctrine. of self-defense.
SELF INCRIMINATION.
People -v.- R~icmtat,- 132- N- Y. Supp.' 556.- Where a person indicted for
crime-is subpoenaed,'befre-'the-,grand -jury and- questioned as to- a transaction
connected with -the chakrge on which theindictment against him- was -basedk and
he refuses to answer on the ground that his answer might tend, to incriminate-
him, and he is then taken before a justice of the Supreme Court, who directs him
to answer the questions, which he then did, his conviction is of such doubtful'
validity that. a certificate, of reasonable doubt will be granted;, his, rights having
been ipreserved~by .proper-motions), objections- andrexceptions;,
